Cognition as Interaction:
Making Room for Atheoretical Cognition
PhD Thesis 2017-2020, University of Wollongong (Australia), International Postgraduate Award
This thesis offers positive reasons for thinking that, at its core, cognition is interactive in character. In making room for this possibility it however challenges the widespread assumption that cognition is fundamentally theoretical in character. Analytic philosophers of cognition and cognitive scientists tend to model all forms of cognition on theorising of some kind or other: they assume Cognition is Essentially Theoretical, or CET. CET, as a thesis about cognition is inspired by the idea that we always and everywhere take an intellectual, theoretical stance towards the things we deal with in the world, whatever they may be. The picture of what such adopting a theorizing stance involves is inspired by standard views in the philosophy of science. Scientific theorizing is the basis of predictions and explanations, where this is typically assumed to involve making inferences, and forming and testing hypotheses about various subject matters. To assume that cognizing is always some kind theorising leaves open whether the theorising in question is always conceptually grounded and propositional or couched in some form of modelling that need not be intrinsically contentful. Yet whatever particular view on takes on the character of the theorizing in question, those committed to CET assume that cognition always involves theorizing of some kind or other.
A serious challenge for CET emerges from the more radical versions of E approaches to cognition. For radicals, cognition is best understood in terms of dynamically unfolding, situated embodied interactions and engagements between the organism and aspects of its world. Radically Enactive Cognition, or REC, disputes that the most basic forms of cognition involve or constitute any mediated form of knowledge or content. Interestingly even radical forms of enactivism need not reject CET. In the case of modelling, cognition is intrinsically contentless and yet a form of modelling, which is sufficient for CET. In this case, there must be special reasons why systems that can be modelled, like the nervous system, must themselves be modelling and, therefore, are theorising.
What this thesis shows, by focusing on Modularity theories of the mind and Bayesian theories of the mind, is that there are reasons to challenge the special reasons. The very core of this thesis is to raise doubts as to whether we need to conceive of cognitive interactions in terms of modelling and thereby theorising. What is distinctive about the position defended in this thesis is that cognition is not special in this regard and, thus, reject cognition as essentially theorising.
Making Room for Atheoretical Cognition
PhD Thesis 2017-2020, University of Wollongong (Australia), International Postgraduate Award
This thesis offers positive reasons for thinking that, at its core, cognition is interactive in character. In making room for this possibility it however challenges the widespread assumption that cognition is fundamentally theoretical in character. Analytic philosophers of cognition and cognitive scientists tend to model all forms of cognition on theorising of some kind or other: they assume Cognition is Essentially Theoretical, or CET. CET, as a thesis about cognition is inspired by the idea that we always and everywhere take an intellectual, theoretical stance towards the things we deal with in the world, whatever they may be. The picture of what such adopting a theorizing stance involves is inspired by standard views in the philosophy of science. Scientific theorizing is the basis of predictions and explanations, where this is typically assumed to involve making inferences, and forming and testing hypotheses about various subject matters. To assume that cognizing is always some kind theorising leaves open whether the theorising in question is always conceptually grounded and propositional or couched in some form of modelling that need not be intrinsically contentful. Yet whatever particular view on takes on the character of the theorizing in question, those committed to CET assume that cognition always involves theorizing of some kind or other.
A serious challenge for CET emerges from the more radical versions of E approaches to cognition. For radicals, cognition is best understood in terms of dynamically unfolding, situated embodied interactions and engagements between the organism and aspects of its world. Radically Enactive Cognition, or REC, disputes that the most basic forms of cognition involve or constitute any mediated form of knowledge or content. Interestingly even radical forms of enactivism need not reject CET. In the case of modelling, cognition is intrinsically contentless and yet a form of modelling, which is sufficient for CET. In this case, there must be special reasons why systems that can be modelled, like the nervous system, must themselves be modelling and, therefore, are theorising.
What this thesis shows, by focusing on Modularity theories of the mind and Bayesian theories of the mind, is that there are reasons to challenge the special reasons. The very core of this thesis is to raise doubts as to whether we need to conceive of cognitive interactions in terms of modelling and thereby theorising. What is distinctive about the position defended in this thesis is that cognition is not special in this regard and, thus, reject cognition as essentially theorising.
Hilbert 24th problem (2016-)
Team member
Mathematics Department, Nova University of Lisbon, Foundation of Science and Technology funded project
The Notion of Mathematical Proof” (2014-2015).
Grant Research Fellow,
Centre for Artificial Intelligence, Nova University of Lisbon, at the Science and Technology Foundation (FCT) funded Project
In this project, we review the current state of the notion of mathematical proof, with special emphasis on recent developments on probabilistic proofs and computer-assisted proofs. The principle goal is to obtain a better philosophical understanding of the nature of proofs in general, and computerized proofs in particular.
The Cognitive Foundations of the Self” (2013-2014).
Grant Research Fellow,
Institute for Philosophy of Nova, Nova University of Lisbon, at the Science and Technology Foundation (FCT) funded Project
These are exciting times in what the studies regarding the notion of the ‘Self’ are concerned. Nevertheless, the transdisplinary approach (phenomenology, cognitive neuroscience, psychiatry, psychoanalysis) comes with a cost: a taxonomical confusion and fragmentation inherent to the proliferation of such distinct methodological approaches. Philosophy, given its general, far reaching, synoptic and conceptual approach, is specially suited to overcome this unfortunate scenario by providing conceptual clarification that facilitates the establishment of links between disciplines. This is the aim of the current research proposal: to adopt a general methodology suited to solve the problem of the conceptual fragmentation of the notion of ‘Self’.
Project Fund: PTDC/FIL-FCI/110978/2009
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: Re-evaluating a project” (2013)
Grant Research Fellow,
Institute for Philosophy of Nova, Nova University of Lisbon, at the Science and Technology Foundation (FCT) funded Project
The project aims to trace the development of Wittgenstein’s second book project laying the foundations for a principled view of the origin of the Philosophical Investigations. The idea is to yield an adequate view of what belongs in the Philosophical Investigations corpus, while at the same time showing what its status is. In this way, the connections between the philosophy of culture and mind and the philosophy of psychology, on one hand, and between these and the philosophy of mathematics, on the other, as spread among Wittgenstein’s various projects for the Philosophical Investigations, will be re-evaluated. The majority of these sources have been available since 2000 in the Bergen Electronic Edition of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, but we are still in need of a thorough examination of them. In addition, new items have come to light in the meantime which justify a close study. It is such a philological-philosophical study that the project aims to carry out, analysing the genesis of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and also editing hitherto unpublished texts. Our understanding of the Philosophical Investigations project and its relation to other Nachlass parts and periods will be significantly improved, and this will make it possible to establish its potential for continued influence on 21st century thought in ways that are anchored to a secure text basis. This objective will be achieved in close cooperation with the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB).
Hilbert 24th problem (2016-)
Team member
Mathematics Department, Nova University of Lisbon, Foundation of Science and Technology funded project
- In 2000, a draft note of Hilbert was found concerning a 24th problem for his Paris problem list.
- This problem concerns simplicity of proofs.
- The aim of the project to reassess Hilbert’s 24th problem as a philosophical challenge (rather than a purely formal exercise).
- We take a closer look at the specifically mathematical examples that concerned Hilbert himself, in particular syzygies (the modern understanding of which is subsumed by the notion of Gröbner bases).
- Syzygies are, however, just a starting point for looking at Hilbert’s problem in other suitable mathematical contexts.
- Special emphasis is put on the potential impact of Hilbert’s 24th problem on contemporary philosophy of mathematics.
The Notion of Mathematical Proof” (2014-2015).
Grant Research Fellow,
Centre for Artificial Intelligence, Nova University of Lisbon, at the Science and Technology Foundation (FCT) funded Project
In this project, we review the current state of the notion of mathematical proof, with special emphasis on recent developments on probabilistic proofs and computer-assisted proofs. The principle goal is to obtain a better philosophical understanding of the nature of proofs in general, and computerized proofs in particular.
The Cognitive Foundations of the Self” (2013-2014).
Grant Research Fellow,
Institute for Philosophy of Nova, Nova University of Lisbon, at the Science and Technology Foundation (FCT) funded Project
These are exciting times in what the studies regarding the notion of the ‘Self’ are concerned. Nevertheless, the transdisplinary approach (phenomenology, cognitive neuroscience, psychiatry, psychoanalysis) comes with a cost: a taxonomical confusion and fragmentation inherent to the proliferation of such distinct methodological approaches. Philosophy, given its general, far reaching, synoptic and conceptual approach, is specially suited to overcome this unfortunate scenario by providing conceptual clarification that facilitates the establishment of links between disciplines. This is the aim of the current research proposal: to adopt a general methodology suited to solve the problem of the conceptual fragmentation of the notion of ‘Self’.
Project Fund: PTDC/FIL-FCI/110978/2009
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: Re-evaluating a project” (2013)
Grant Research Fellow,
Institute for Philosophy of Nova, Nova University of Lisbon, at the Science and Technology Foundation (FCT) funded Project
The project aims to trace the development of Wittgenstein’s second book project laying the foundations for a principled view of the origin of the Philosophical Investigations. The idea is to yield an adequate view of what belongs in the Philosophical Investigations corpus, while at the same time showing what its status is. In this way, the connections between the philosophy of culture and mind and the philosophy of psychology, on one hand, and between these and the philosophy of mathematics, on the other, as spread among Wittgenstein’s various projects for the Philosophical Investigations, will be re-evaluated. The majority of these sources have been available since 2000 in the Bergen Electronic Edition of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, but we are still in need of a thorough examination of them. In addition, new items have come to light in the meantime which justify a close study. It is such a philological-philosophical study that the project aims to carry out, analysing the genesis of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and also editing hitherto unpublished texts. Our understanding of the Philosophical Investigations project and its relation to other Nachlass parts and periods will be significantly improved, and this will make it possible to establish its potential for continued influence on 21st century thought in ways that are anchored to a secure text basis. This objective will be achieved in close cooperation with the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB).
