Is perception cognitively penetrable?
Colour perception can be cognitively penetrated just in case contentful attitudes of belief, knowledge and the like can contentfully inform what we see when viewing colours. It will be cognitively impenetrable just in case there are aspects of what is perceived in colour perception that remain untouched or outstrip what can be supplied by such contentful attitudes. My research reviews the most up to date empirical findings and philosophical consideration in asking whether colour perceiving can be cognitively penetrated. it assesses reasons to doubt that cognitive penetrability of colour perception is possible; raises questions about appropriateness of the very idea of cognitive penetrability; and proposes an alternative way of thinking about the target phenomenon.
I suggest that A way of handling with the evidence that the relation between the history of interactions with the environment and how something is perceived could be explained by adopting a predictive processing account of perception, according to which the brain constantly and pro-actively models and forms hypotheses about what is perceived in the sensory stream and it corrects its predictions by incoming sensory information in an ongoing attempt to minimize error. One major task of my research is to expose how adopting a predictive processing framework raises deep questions about possibility of cognitive penetrability, as understood by the lights of the Modularity Thesis. Another major task of my research is to determine whether predictive processing is at odds with the Phenomenality variant of the cognitive penetrability thesis.
I examine Case studies concerning colour illusion will be examined in an effort to show that there is a phenomenal character of colour experience that outstrips anything that can be supplied by contentful attitudes and inferential hypotheses. Based on these analyses, O explore whether we need to rethink the phenomenon associated with cognitive penetrability, and whether it might not be more appropriately characterised by acknowledging that some aspects of colour perceiving might be cognitive impermeable. In proposing this i explore a radical enactive and embodied theories in cognitive science that allow that a perceiver’s environment, training and culture might inform how we see colours while still making room for the possibility that some phenomenal aspects of colour perceiving remains cognitively impermeable.