Theoretical Perception in the Predictive Mind (2017-)
University of Wollongong (Australia.) University Postgraduate Award, and International Postgraduate Tuition Award,
This thesis scrutinises whether the predictive mind, most notably predictive processing and active inference, support a view of brain and cognitive function as modular. In so far as the Bayesian brain supports modularity, which notion of modularity does it capture? The classical notion, i.e. the mind as composed by a set of modular input systems and a central cognitive system, all systems with limited communication among them (Fodor 1983)? Or, do Bayesian approaches suggest a revised and perhaps weaker notion of modularity? Conversely, do these Bayesian frameworks speak against the idea that brain and cognitive function is modular and, if so, what might the consequences of this be for work in the sciences of brain and cognition? In addition to addressing these broad scope issues and their implications, this thesis also seeks to examine specific and outstanding questions in the field for the notion of modularity in light of the Bayesian brain, which include, the following questions: can one explain visual illusions in frameworks that draw a sharp distinction between cognition and perception? Does perception communicate freely with higher forms of cognition, and what does ‘communication’ mean? Does the newly revised cognitive penetrability framework offer explanatory gain in all or some Bayesian approaches? Do Bayesian views of brain and cognition imply that there is no distinction at all between perception, cognition and action? Or, might these views be entirely compatible with ‘standard’ modular accounts of perception?
University of Wollongong (Australia.) University Postgraduate Award, and International Postgraduate Tuition Award,
This thesis scrutinises whether the predictive mind, most notably predictive processing and active inference, support a view of brain and cognitive function as modular. In so far as the Bayesian brain supports modularity, which notion of modularity does it capture? The classical notion, i.e. the mind as composed by a set of modular input systems and a central cognitive system, all systems with limited communication among them (Fodor 1983)? Or, do Bayesian approaches suggest a revised and perhaps weaker notion of modularity? Conversely, do these Bayesian frameworks speak against the idea that brain and cognitive function is modular and, if so, what might the consequences of this be for work in the sciences of brain and cognition? In addition to addressing these broad scope issues and their implications, this thesis also seeks to examine specific and outstanding questions in the field for the notion of modularity in light of the Bayesian brain, which include, the following questions: can one explain visual illusions in frameworks that draw a sharp distinction between cognition and perception? Does perception communicate freely with higher forms of cognition, and what does ‘communication’ mean? Does the newly revised cognitive penetrability framework offer explanatory gain in all or some Bayesian approaches? Do Bayesian views of brain and cognition imply that there is no distinction at all between perception, cognition and action? Or, might these views be entirely compatible with ‘standard’ modular accounts of perception?
Duck-rabbit
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Müller-Lyer illusion
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This thesis argues that some forms of perception are atheoretical. The modularity of mind was in the twentieth century and is still today one of the most influential theories of cognition set firmly within the naturalistic tradition. It is orientated to answer questions about how cognition and perception interrelate. Modular theorists broadly agree that perception is theoretical. A disagreement however – the ladenness debate – sets a mutually exclusive disjunction as to whether perception is directly influenced by cognition, Quine arguing for a very high degree and Fodor none.
A new view of the mind as Bayesian is today increasingly dominating the cognitive sciences. What makes this new view interesting at the light of the ladenness debate is that ratifies the Quinean contention that perception is theory laden. The Bayesian brain, call it the predictive mind, opens the communication channels between higher and lower levels, i.e. cognition and perception. Though promising, theoretical and empirical evidence challenge the freely open channels of communication. This brings some theorists to appeal to Fodorian modules to some of the explanatory work within a Quinean-inspired mechanism.
The aim of this thesis is to show that considering that the predictive mind’s update mechanism philosophically aligns Quinean theory-ladden perception, appealing to Fodorian modules ends up in contradiction. This thesis addresses the challenges by critically examining the contradiction and arguing that some forms of perception are atheoretical. Taking instead a route less taken, in line with enactivism, positively opens refreshing philosophical avenues as well as new directions in the cognitive science of perception.
Talk
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Hilbert 24th problem (2016-)
Team member
Mathematics Department, Nova University of Lisbon, Foundation of Science and Technology funded project
- In 2000, a draft note of Hilbert was found concerning a 24th problem for his Paris problem list.
- This problem concerns simplicity of proofs.
- The aim of the project to reassess Hilbert’s 24th problem as a philosophical challenge (rather than a purely formal exercise).
- We take a closer look at the specifically mathematical examples that concerned Hilbert himself, in particular syzygies (the modern understanding of which is subsumed by the notion of Gröbner bases).
- Syzygies are, however, just a starting point for looking at Hilbert’s problem in other suitable mathematical contexts.
- Special emphasis is put on the potential impact of Hilbert’s 24th problem on contemporary philosophy of mathematics.
The Notion of Mathematical Proof” (2014-2015).
Grant Research Fellow,
Centre for Artificial Intelligence, Nova University of Lisbon, at the Science and Technology Foundation (FCT) funded Project
In this project, we review the current state of the notion of mathematical proof, with special emphasis on recent developments on probabilistic proofs and computer-assisted proofs. The principle goal is to obtain a better philosophical understanding of the nature of proofs in general, and computerized proofs in particular.
The Cognitive Foundations of the Self” (2013-2014).
Grant Research Fellow,
Institute for Philosophy of Nova, Nova University of Lisbon, at the Science and Technology Foundation (FCT) funded Project
These are exciting times in what the studies regarding the notion of the ‘Self’ are concerned. Nevertheless, the transdisplinary approach (phenomenology, cognitive neuroscience, psychiatry, psychoanalysis) comes with a cost: a taxonomical confusion and fragmentation inherent to the proliferation of such distinct methodological approaches. Philosophy, given its general, far reaching, synoptic and conceptual approach, is specially suited to overcome this unfortunate scenario by providing conceptual clarification that facilitates the establishment of links between disciplines. This is the aim of the current research proposal: to adopt a general methodology suited to solve the problem of the conceptual fragmentation of the notion of ‘Self’.
Project Fund: PTDC/FIL-FCI/110978/2009
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: Re-evaluating a project” (2013)
Grant Research Fellow,
Institute for Philosophy of Nova, Nova University of Lisbon, at the Science and Technology Foundation (FCT) funded Project
The project aims to trace the development of Wittgenstein’s second book project laying the foundations for a principled view of the origin of the Philosophical Investigations. The idea is to yield an adequate view of what belongs in the Philosophical Investigations corpus, while at the same time showing what its status is. In this way, the connections between the philosophy of culture and mind and the philosophy of psychology, on one hand, and between these and the philosophy of mathematics, on the other, as spread among Wittgenstein’s various projects for the Philosophical Investigations, will be re-evaluated. The majority of these sources have been available since 2000 in the Bergen Electronic Edition of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, but we are still in need of a thorough examination of them. In addition, new items have come to light in the meantime which justify a close study. It is such a philological-philosophical study that the project aims to carry out, analysing the genesis of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and also editing hitherto unpublished texts. Our understanding of the Philosophical Investigations project and its relation to other Nachlass parts and periods will be significantly improved, and this will make it possible to establish its potential for continued influence on 21st century thought in ways that are anchored to a secure text basis. This objective will be achieved in close cooperation with the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB).
