Is perception cognitively penetrable? (2017-)
University of Wollongong (Australia.) University Postgraduate Award, and International Postgraduate Tuition Award,
Colour perception can be cognitively penetrated just in case contentful attitudes of belief, knowledge and the like can contentfully inform what we see when viewing colours. It will be cognitively impenetrable just in case there are aspects of what is perceived in colour perception that remain untouched or outstrip what can be supplied by such contentful attitudes. My research reviews the most up to date empirical findings and philosophical consideration in asking whether colour perceiving can be cognitively penetrated. it assesses reasons to doubt that cognitive penetrability of colour perception is possible; raises questions about appropriateness of the very idea of cognitive penetrability; and proposes an alternative way of thinking about the target phenomenon.
I suggest that A way of handling with the evidence that the relation between the history of interactions with the environment and how something is perceived could be explained by adopting a predictive processing account of perception, according to which the brain constantly and pro-actively models and forms hypotheses about what is perceived in the sensory stream and it corrects its predictions by incoming sensory information in an ongoing attempt to minimize error. One major task of my research is to expose how adopting a predictive processing framework raises deep questions about possibility of cognitive penetrability, as understood by the lights of the Modularity Thesis. Another major task of my research is to determine whether predictive processing is at odds with the Phenomenality variant of the cognitive penetrability thesis.
I examine Case studies concerning colour illusion will be examined in an effort to show that there is a phenomenal character of colour experience that outstrips anything that can be supplied by contentful attitudes and inferential hypotheses. Based on these analyses, O explore whether we need to rethink the phenomenon associated with cognitive penetrability, and whether it might not be more appropriately characterised by acknowledging that some aspects of colour perceiving might be cognitive impermeable. In proposing this i explore a radical enactive and embodied theories in cognitive science that allow that a perceiver’s environment, training and culture might inform how we see colours while still making room for the possibility that some phenomenal aspects of colour perceiving remains cognitively impermeable.
University of Wollongong (Australia.) University Postgraduate Award, and International Postgraduate Tuition Award,
Colour perception can be cognitively penetrated just in case contentful attitudes of belief, knowledge and the like can contentfully inform what we see when viewing colours. It will be cognitively impenetrable just in case there are aspects of what is perceived in colour perception that remain untouched or outstrip what can be supplied by such contentful attitudes. My research reviews the most up to date empirical findings and philosophical consideration in asking whether colour perceiving can be cognitively penetrated. it assesses reasons to doubt that cognitive penetrability of colour perception is possible; raises questions about appropriateness of the very idea of cognitive penetrability; and proposes an alternative way of thinking about the target phenomenon.
I suggest that A way of handling with the evidence that the relation between the history of interactions with the environment and how something is perceived could be explained by adopting a predictive processing account of perception, according to which the brain constantly and pro-actively models and forms hypotheses about what is perceived in the sensory stream and it corrects its predictions by incoming sensory information in an ongoing attempt to minimize error. One major task of my research is to expose how adopting a predictive processing framework raises deep questions about possibility of cognitive penetrability, as understood by the lights of the Modularity Thesis. Another major task of my research is to determine whether predictive processing is at odds with the Phenomenality variant of the cognitive penetrability thesis.
I examine Case studies concerning colour illusion will be examined in an effort to show that there is a phenomenal character of colour experience that outstrips anything that can be supplied by contentful attitudes and inferential hypotheses. Based on these analyses, O explore whether we need to rethink the phenomenon associated with cognitive penetrability, and whether it might not be more appropriately characterised by acknowledging that some aspects of colour perceiving might be cognitive impermeable. In proposing this i explore a radical enactive and embodied theories in cognitive science that allow that a perceiver’s environment, training and culture might inform how we see colours while still making room for the possibility that some phenomenal aspects of colour perceiving remains cognitively impermeable.
Hilbert 24th problem (2016-)
Team member
Mathematics Department, Nova University of Lisbon, Foundation of Science and Technology funded project
- In 2000, a draft note of Hilbert was found concerning a 24th problem for his Paris problem list.
- This problem concerns simplicity of proofs.
- The aim of the project to reassess Hilbert’s 24th problem as a philosophical challenge (rather than a purely formal exercise).
- We take a closer look at the specifically mathematical examples that concerned Hilbert himself, in particular syzygies (the modern understanding of which is subsumed by the notion of Gröbner bases).
- Syzygies are, however, just a starting point for looking at Hilbert’s problem in other suitable mathematical contexts.
- Special emphasis is put on the potential impact of Hilbert’s 24th problem on contemporary philosophy of mathematics.
The Notion of Mathematical Proof” (2014-2015).
Grant Research Fellow,
Centre for Artificial Intelligence, Nova University of Lisbon, at the Science and Technology Foundation (FCT) funded Project
In this project, we review the current state of the notion of mathematical proof, with special emphasis on recent developments on probabilistic proofs and computer-assisted proofs. The principle goal is to obtain a better philosophical understanding of the nature of proofs in general, and computerized proofs in particular.
The Cognitive Foundations of the Self” (2013-2014).
Grant Research Fellow,
Institute for Philosophy of Nova, Nova University of Lisbon, at the Science and Technology Foundation (FCT) funded Project
These are exciting times in what the studies regarding the notion of the ‘Self’ are concerned. Nevertheless, the transdisplinary approach (phenomenology, cognitive neuroscience, psychiatry, psychoanalysis) comes with a cost: a taxonomical confusion and fragmentation inherent to the proliferation of such distinct methodological approaches. Philosophy, given its general, far reaching, synoptic and conceptual approach, is specially suited to overcome this unfortunate scenario by providing conceptual clarification that facilitates the establishment of links between disciplines. This is the aim of the current research proposal: to adopt a general methodology suited to solve the problem of the conceptual fragmentation of the notion of ‘Self’.
Project Fund: PTDC/FIL-FCI/110978/2009
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: Re-evaluating a project” (2013)
Grant Research Fellow,
Institute for Philosophy of Nova, Nova University of Lisbon, at the Science and Technology Foundation (FCT) funded Project
The project aims to trace the development of Wittgenstein’s second book project laying the foundations for a principled view of the origin of the Philosophical Investigations. The idea is to yield an adequate view of what belongs in the Philosophical Investigations corpus, while at the same time showing what its status is. In this way, the connections between the philosophy of culture and mind and the philosophy of psychology, on one hand, and between these and the philosophy of mathematics, on the other, as spread among Wittgenstein’s various projects for the Philosophical Investigations, will be re-evaluated. The majority of these sources have been available since 2000 in the Bergen Electronic Edition of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, but we are still in need of a thorough examination of them. In addition, new items have come to light in the meantime which justify a close study. It is such a philological-philosophical study that the project aims to carry out, analysing the genesis of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and also editing hitherto unpublished texts. Our understanding of the Philosophical Investigations project and its relation to other Nachlass parts and periods will be significantly improved, and this will make it possible to establish its potential for continued influence on 21st century thought in ways that are anchored to a secure text basis. This objective will be achieved in close cooperation with the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB).
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