Academics and post-graduate students from Macquarie University, The University of Sydney and The University of Wollongong presented their research on Sydney Philosophy of Psychology, 2017.
Wittgenstein and Applied Epistemology 6th Symposium of the International Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (ILWG)
Nova Institute of Philosophy (IFILNOVA)
Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, New University of Lisbon (FCSH/NOVA)
Scientific Organization: Nuno Venturinha
6-7 June 2017
Invited speakers include:
Marco Brusotti (Technical University of Berlin / University of Salento)
Michel Le Du (University of Strasbourg)
Andrew Lugg (University of Ottawa)
Sofia Miguens (University of Porto)
Constantine Sandis (University of Hertfordshire)
Vicente Sanfélix (University of Valencia)
Genia Schönbaumsfeld (University of Southampton)
We are looking for up to 2 papers to round off the edited collection “Methodological Advances in Experimental Philosophy” in preparation for publication in the
Advances in Experimental Philosophy series (Bloomsbury, series editor: James Beebe): http://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/series/advances-in-experimental-philosophy/
The volume aims to familiarise experimental philosophers (professional academics, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates) with empirical methods that go beyond questionnaire-based surveys and experiments, and to explore the contribution these methods can make to current and traditional debates in philosophy. Methods of interest include, but are not limited to, methods from cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience (e.g., fMRI), psycholinguistics (e.g. eye tracking, ERP), computational linguistics and the digital humanities more widely (data mining, etc.), as well as behavioural economics. Contributions should illustrate the use of a particular method or set of methods in experimental philosophy either by reporting a fresh study, or by reference to recent studies run by the author(s) and others, or ideally by a combination of the two. Studies that combine such ‘alternative’ methods with more familiar questionnaire-based approaches are welcome.
Contributions should provide accessible explanations of the ‘alternative’ methods used, with discussion of their strengths and limitations. Each chapter should combine presentation, demonstration, and discussion of a chosen (set of) method(s) with an explanation and assessment of the contribution made to traditional philosophical concerns or ongoing philosophical debates. Contributions to any area of philosophy are welcome, provided the concerns or debates at issue are of reasonably general interest. Contributions to the Concept Project (studying concepts and folk theories) and Warrant Project (studying the evidentiary value of intuitions) would be particularly welcome.
Confirmed contributors include Shaun Nichols, Mark Alfano, Arianna Betti, Cailin O’Connor, Eugen Fischer, Matthew Inglis, Jonathan Livengood, Eric Schwitzgebel, Justin Sytsma, and Jen Cole Wright.
The default word limit for submitted papers is 10,000 words.
If potentially interested in contributing, please contact the volume editor: Eugen Fischer,
Deadlines: 500-word abstracts to be submitted to the volume editor before July 1st, 2017.
Chapters will be due by January 31, 2018.
Empedocles is the first to bring forth a theory of color. In color vision, he says, the eye somehow takes in, or physically ‘ingests’ material effluences emitted by the distal object. Demokritos further attempted to explain the characteristics of particular colors by reference to the characteristics of the atoms constituting them. Like Demokritos, Plato also reckoned with self-radiating objects; but Plato thought that their rays meet and mingle with the pure fire (rays) placed in all human eyes by the gods. In the Timaeus, Plato states that particles coming from other bodies fall upon the sight. Thus seeing (or not seeing) depends on the size, strength and speed of the rays emanating from the objects, while perception of the various colors depends also on that process (see Benson, 2000).
Aristotle rejected the notion that a fiery ray emanated from the eye and reflected back from the objects to create sight—on the grounds that if this were so, night vision would be normal. By the same token he objected to the theory of emanations from objects, since the eye does not perceive them when the objects are pressed against the closed eye. He postulated the necessity of a medium between the eye and its percept, and reached back to the Presocratic translucence (diaphanes), which exists in water, air and translucent objects. Light is the agent (energeia) that reveals translucence as an incorporeal state ranging from bright to dark. Insofar as this flows into objects it ceases being mere light and reveals color as well as their substantiality. The color of the object in turn puts the medium itself in motion and this is transmitted to the eye. Obviously, the role of light is to make this process possible, but Aristotle attributes no movement to it, whereas the resulting color is an activator (kinetikon) of the medium (Benson, 2000). Aristotle’s theory of color contrasts thus with Empedocles and Plato, in the sense that “the assimilation of the sensible form without the matter of the perceived object” is how Aristotle defines perception: “color is a power to move, or alter, what is transparent”. He draws a clear distinction between the physiological activity in the eye and the sensory presentation of color to the perceptive part of the soul. Aristotle conceives of light as incorporeal activity. It is a state of a potentially transparent medium, a state akin to, or equivalent to, a state of illumination.
For Aristotle, a substance together with its accidents forms a certain whole. The whole would seem to be such that substance is the first part, after which come quality, quantity, and the other accidents (Metaph. XII, in init.) (Brentano, 1981, p. 82). Aristotle is convinced that whole and part can never be actual simultaneously. At the root of his theory of categories is a theory of the relation of whole and part. If the whole is actual, then the part is merely potential. How does this applies to a thing extended in space? Conceptually, the accident always contains the substance, hence the real unity of the accident. Concept red contains, in Aristotle’s view, the concept colored, and the concept colored contains the concept sensibly qualitative. What is in question in Aristotle’s theory of categories is thus that it is not the plurality of individual parts; rather all attributes entering into the definition determine one and the same individual. Like any other scientific terms, “category” as undergone several changes of meaning in the course of history, Brentano himself disagreed in several arguments with Aristotle (see Brentano, 1981, part II pp. 81-89). Nevertheless, “this much is certain: he [Aristotle] thought that there was a sense of the term being for each category; and in making the classification, he wanted to distinguish as many different senses of being” (Brentano, 1981, p. 90). Thus, to arrive at the true understanding of perception, we must see the distinction between a subject and that which the subject underlies, such as sensible, quality, place, real time, extension, shape, – in fact, substantial determinations.
 For a detailed analysis, see Kalderon, M. E. (2015). Form without matter: Empedocles and Aristotle on color perception. OUP Oxford.
Aristotle, (1998). Metaphysics translated with an introduction by H. Lawson-Tancred. Penguin.
Benson, J. L. (2000). Greek color theory. Greek Color Theory and the Four Elements, 6. Art, Architecture & Art History at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst.
Brentano, F. (1981). The Theory of Categories. Melbourne International Philosophy Series, Vol. 8. London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
The 6th Asian Australian Identities (AAI6) conference of the Asian Australian Studies Research Network (AASRN)