It is, however, hard to understand why we do not see the world as na assembly of dots
The world we see is not the world itself. Metzger, in his Laws of Seeing (1936), justifies such claims with three major observations:
- There are percepts for which there is no direct correlate in the physical stimulus. Examples are brightness enhancement and illusory contours
- Certain things are not seen though they are clearly before our eyes. Examples of this are objects that by their proximity and structure become part of an edge or become embedded in larger configurations (hidden objects).
- We see objects, but differently from the way they are. Some examples are made from stimulus conditions (microgenesis) as well as many geometric-optical illusions, where we misperceive shapes, sizes, and angles of stimuli. These observations are undeniable, they cannot be overridden by better knowledge of the actual stimulus, and they have reality of their own.
As Metzger remarkably explains (1936, xv),
On a more recent account of this problem, I present the methodological issue on the post Special issue Quantitative Approaches in Gestalt Perception, a review).
Metzger, W. (1936). Gesetze des Sehens. 2., erw. Aufl. Frankfurt a. M.: Kramer.
Metzger, W. (2006) Laws of Seeing. Cambridge Mass: MIT Press (original work, 1936).