University of WollongongBuilding 19.2072, Research Hub (2nd Floor)

Understanding how perception and cognition relate is one of philosophy’s oldest concerns. There has been renewed interest in investigating this age-old question with the advent of new developments in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Contributions to this conference will examine questions such as: How can we best explain visual illusions that put perceiving at odds with cognising? Is perception distinct from other forms of cognition, such as imagination or hallucination? Are they distinct psychological kinds that carve a ‘joint in nature’? Does perception communicate freely with higher forms of cognition? Is the latter capable of informing the former? Do the newly minted predictive processing theories do away with the perception/cognition divide altogether? Are they compatible with and do they support traditional modular accounts of vision?

Contact Details. inesh@uow.edu.au

See all details here.]]>

@The School of Liberal arts inaugural conference – Understanding Others through Narrative Practices – on Friday 5th April 2019 at the University of Wollongong.

]]>In 2000, Rüdiger Thiele [1] found in a notebook of David Hilbert, kept in Hilbert's

(a) The textThe short paragraph reads in German as follows: Als 24stes Problem in meinem Pariser Vortrag wollte ich die Frage stellen: Kriterien für die Einfachheit bez. Beweis der grössten Einfachheit von gewissen Beweisen führen. Ueberhaupt eine Theorie der Beweismethoden in der Mathematik entwickeln. Es kann doch bei gegebenen Voraussetzungen nur einen einfachsten Beweis geben. Ueberhaupt, wenn man für einen Satz 2 Beweise hat, so muss man nicht eher ruhen, als bis man sie beide aufeinander zurückgeführt hat oder genau erkannt hat, welche verschiedenen Voraussetzungen (und Hilfsmittel) bei den Beweisen benutzt werden: Wenn man 2 Wege hat, so muss man nicht bloss diese Wege gehen oder neue suchen, sondern dann das ganze zwischen den beiden Wegen liegende Gebiet erforschen. Ansätze, die Einfachheit der Beweise zu beurteilen, bieten meine Untersuchungen über Syzygien und Syzygien zwischen Syzygien. Die Benutzung oder Kenntnisse einer Syzygie vereinfacht den Beweis, dass eine gewisse Identität richtig ist, erheblich. Da jeder Process des Addierens Anwendung des commutativen Gesetzes der Addition ist—dies immer geometrischen Sätzen oder logischen Schlüssen entspricht, so kann man diese zählen und z. B. beim Beweis bestimmter Sätze in der Elementargeometrie (Pythagoras oder über merkwürdige Punkte im Dreieck) sehr wohl entscheiden, welches der einfachste Beweis ist. (figure 1).

Figure 1.Copy from Hilbert's notebook [5, Heft 3, p. 25f]. We are grateful to the

An English translation was given by Thiele as follows:

The 24th problem in my Paris lecture was to be: Criteria of simplicity, or proof of the greatest simplicity of certain proofs. Develop a theory of the method of proof in mathematics in general. Under a given set of conditions there can be but one simplest proof. Quite generally, if there are two proofs for a theorem, you must keep going until you have derived each from the other, or until it becomes quite evident what variant conditions (and aids) have been used in the two proofs. Given two routes, it is not right to take either of these two or to look for a third; it is necessary to investigate the area lying between the two routes. Attempts at judging the simplicity of a proof are in my examination of syzygies and syzygies between syzygies. The use or the knowledge of a syzygy simplifies in an essential way a proof that a certain identity is true. Because any process of addition [is] an application of the commutative law of addition etc. [and because] this always corresponds to geometric theorems or logical conclusions, one can count these [processes], and, for instance, in proving certain theorems of elementary geometry (the Pythagoras theorem, [theorems] on remarkable points of triangles), one can very well decide which of the proofs is the simplest.

(b) Historical tracesHilbert did not include this problem in the list of the now famous 23 problems from the International Congress of Mathematicians in Paris in 1900. We have no indications for his motives, and it would be pure speculation to discuss such possible motives.

There are two (very thin) threads of the 24th problem in Hilbert's work.1 The published version2 of his contribution to the International Congress of Mathematician contains some general considerations which address

Besides, it is an error to believe that rigor in the proof is the enemy of simplicity. On the contrary, we find it confirmed by numerous examples that the rigorous method is at the same time the simpler and the more easily comprehended. The very effort for rigor forces us to find out simpler methods of proof.

This claim is illustrated by referring to three examples concerning

There is only one other instance where we found simplicity mentioned in David Hilbert's work, albeit at a very prominent place. In September 1917, Hilbert gave a talk at the Swiss Mathematical Society with the title

By closer inspection, we realize soon that the question of consistency for the whole numbers and sets is not an isolated one, but it belongs to a wide range of most difficult epistemological questions of specific mathematical colouring: I mention, to characterize briefly this area of questions, the problem of the principle

A ‘

As possible exception, one could think of Saunders MacLane's PhD dissertation [11,12] written in Göttingen in 1934. Its title ‘Abgekürzte Beweise im Logikkalkul’ (Abbreviated Proofs in Logic Calculus) sounds like an echo of Hilbert's 24th problem. The content, however, does not address simplicity directly, but just brevity of (encoding of) proofs. Officially, MacLane was supervised by Hermann Weyl (Hilbert's successor in Göttingen), but one can safely assume that the de-facto supervisor was Paul Bernays,5 who could still have had reminiscences of the 24th problem in mind. But there is no written evidence to support such a link.

2. The challengesLooking today at Hilbert's 24th problem, which asks for a theory of the method of proof to give criteria of simplicity, one has to admit that we are still not yet there. The problem represents several challenges for philosophers of mathematics, logicians, and mathematicians which are under discussion, but without general solution.

(a) What is a proof?Even the notion of mathematical proof is still a controversial issue (see §3a(i)). Its traditional understanding is, on the one hand, challenged by recent developments of computer-assisted proofs, notably in the context of ‘big proofs’, see, e.g. the collection of papers in [14] or [15]. On the other hand, reflections on

(b) Mathematical proofIn 1900, Hilbert had clearly ordinary mathematical proofs in mind, rather than formal derivations in logical calculi. Thus, an appreciation of Hilbert's 24th problem requires to look at mathematical examples (see §3c(ii)). One should also take Hilbert's own suggestion into account and look to his ‘examination of syzygies and syzygies between syzygies’ (see §3c(ii)). Thiele identified a passage in Hilbert's unpublished lecture notes to which he could have referred [19, lectures XXXII–XXXIX]; see also [1, §11]. Today, we have a rather long list of well-studied examples of theorems with different proofs at hand; while in many instances, it is easy to judge whether one proof is simpler than another (or on which different conditions they depend), for now, it does not look like that these examples would give rise to general criteria. A standard reference for such examples are the

(c) A theory of the method of proofHilbert and his school developed in the 1920s proof theory as a new discipline in the emerging field of mathematical logic. This proof theory was conceived, first of all, to serve

Avigad [25] observed that the standard models of formal deductions are not well-equipped to deal with methods of proofs. He suggests to take into account approaches from computer-assisted theorem proving—like

(d) Proof structureDespite the mathematical character of Hilbert's 24th problem, it is also studied in terms of the logical structure of proofs, see, for instance, Hughes [27,28], Straßburger [29,30] (see also §3b(ii)) and Negri and von Plato [31] (see also §3b(i)), among others. They link the problem mainly with structural properties of formal calculi as studied in Gentzen-style proof theory.

These studies concentrate on aspects of simplicity within the

Still, in very specific areas, as for instance semigroup theory, counting might be a reasonable measure (see §3b(iii)).

(e) Axiom systemsThe simplified claim ‘there can be but one simplest proof’ will surely be rejected by a majority of scholars but Hilbert was careful enough to qualify it by adding ‘under a given set of conditions’. It might still be doubtful whether ‘under a given set of conditions’, indeed, ‘there can be but one simplest proof’. But Hilbert at least made clear, that we have to identify this ‘given set of conditions’ for different proofs (of the same theorem). At least, the identification of different conditions can be seen as the result of an investigation of ‘the area lying between the two routes.’ And in modern terms, such conditions may correspond simply to different axiomatizations (non-logical axioms) of a certain field of mathematics.

In this direction Hilbert's 24th problem was studied by considering variations of (non-logical) axiom systems (e.g. for geometry, for algebra, etc.) which were compared with respect to simplicity of proofs. Here we may refer to the discussion of Pambuccian [33,34] and Alama [35] which gives progressively improved axiomatizations for (hyperbolic) Geometry which allows one to identify various criteria of simplicity for the chosen axioms. The emphasis is, thus, on mathematical content (semantically, in the form of axioms), with little concern for formal calculi and notions defined therein (e.g. proof length). Thus, it focuses more on the axiom systems rather than the proofs themselves (see §3c(i)).

(f) Computer-assisted proof systemsAfter the publication of Hilbert's 24th problem by Rüdiger Thiele [1], various scholars took up the challenge of simplicity in one or the other form. This starts with Thiele himself who published a joint paper with Wos in relation to

(g) Related questionsPurity of method was already addressed by Hilbert—most notably at the end of his famous book

Another question is whether simplicity can play a role in clarifying the notion of explanation in mathematics (see, for instance, [16,45], and §3a(ii)), even if such a clarification was—to our knowledge—not envisaged by Hilbert himself.

Finally, Thiele [1, §9] draws our attention to the relation of simplicity to complexity. In the specific area of computational complexity, we are confronted with questions related to Hilbert's 24th problem, for instance, by asking for a notion of the simplest algorithm.

3. The contributions to this special issueIn the following, we review briefly the contributions to this special issue. It is the aim of this special issue to give a broad view of ongoing discussions concerning Hilbert's 24th problem and of questions related to it.

(a) ProofBefore analysing simplicity of proof, one has to have a clear specification of what a proof is and what purpose(s) it serves. Today we have a clear definition at hand of the notion of

(i) Metaphor of proofNikolai Vavilov questions, indeed, the adequacy of formal proof to represent mathematical proof in his contribution Reshaping the metaphor of proof [46]. He goes even a step further and puts up to discussion the thesis that ‘a mathematical proof

(ii) ExplanationAlison Pease, Andrew Aberdein & Ursula Martin, in their paper Explanation in mathematical conversations: an empirical investigation [47], confront simplicity with the objectives of a ‘good proof’. With empirical data, they discuss six conjectures about mathematical explanation. As a result, their empirical methodology is suggested as a new and fruitful tool to investigate informal notions such as the simplicity of proof.

(iii) Spatial thinkingAlan Cain, in Visual thinking and simplicity of proof [48], draws the attention to ‘how spatial thinking interacts with simplicity in [informal] proof’ by analysing some concrete examples of spatial proofs in mathematics in comparsion with non-spatial ones. It is argued that diagrams and spatial thinking can contribute to simplicity in a number of ways.

(iv) School mathematicsHelena Rocha characterizes, in Mathematical proof: from mathematics to school mathematics [49], ‘the understanding of mathematical proof in school, its function and the meaning and relevance attributed to the notion of simple proof’. It is observed that, in school mathematics, the understanding of proof differs from the understanding in the mathematical research community and, therefore, also the notion of simplicity of proof may be treated differently in school.

(b) Proof structureIt appears that proof theory, as conceived by the Hilbert school in the 1920s is not the ‘theory of the method of proof’ which Hilbert had envisaged in his 24th problem. It plays, however, an important role in the clarification of the notions around any concept of proof. In particular, it gives us a handle on the formal structure of proof.

(i) Proof theorySara Negri & Jan von Plato used prominently the expression

(ii) Proof identityLutz Straßburger focuses on the particular problem of proof identity which clearly relates to simplicity. In his paper, The problem of proof identity, and why computer scientists should care about Hilbert's 24th problem [51], ‘4 objectives that a satisfactory notion of proof identity should obey’ are formulated, and the problem is discussed in the context of Hughes's notion of

(iii) Proof simplificationMichael Kinyon, in Proof simplification and automated theorem proving [52], gives a detailed analysis of a proof in algebra which can be simplified by an automated theorem prover using

(c) Mathematical proofsWhen stating his 24th problem, Hilbert had clearly informal proofs of mathematical theorems in mind, rather than proofs of, let us say, logical tautologies. Therefore, it is particularly interesting to look to examples of Mathematics, including Geometry, Set Theory, and—as Hilbert himself mentioned it—the theory of Syzygies.

(i) Use of axiomsVictor Pambuccian, in his contribution Prolegomena to any theory of proof simplicity [53], draws the attention to the choice of axioms which are used to prove a particular theorem. Using examples from Geometry, he discusses how the

(ii) Variations of proofsWilfried Sieg analyses in The Cantor–Bernstein Theorem: how many proofs? [54] seemingly different proofs of the Cantor–Bernstein Theorem and formalizes their core in Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the conclusion that ‘there is

(iii) SyzygiesAntónio Malheiro and José Francisco Reis, in Identification of proofs via Syzygies [55], follow the suggestion of Hilbert and look to the question of simplicity of proofs in the context of syzygies. The modern theory of Gröbner Bases helps, indeed, to investigate examples of simplifications of polynomials which Hilbert might have had in mind as models for simplifications of proofs.

Data accessibilityThis article has no additional data.

Competing interestsWe declare we have no competing interests.

FundingThis work is partially supported by University Postgraduate Award and the International Postgraduate Tuition Award by the University of Wollongong (Australia) and by the Portuguese Science Foundation, FCT, through the projects UID/MAT/00297/2019 (Centro de Matemática e Aplicações) and PTDC/MHC-FIL/2583/2014 (Hilbert's 24th Problem).

Footnotes1 We follow here the presentation of [6] where one can find a more detailed discussion of these threads.

2 It his talk, Hilbert didn't read the full paper and presented only 10 of the 23 problems explicitly, see [7, p. 68].

3 See also the discussion in [1, § 5]. It is worth noting that this relation was included by Charlotte Angas Scott in her report of Hilbert's oral presentation in Paris: ‘in seeking this rigor we may find simplicity.’ [7, p. 68].

4 Thiele, however, observed that Hilbert included the problem of simplicity in an index for his notebooks [5, Heft 3, inserted page] prepared at the end of his life [1, p. 7]. And, when Bernays wrote in 1967 an encyclopaedia entry for ‘David Hilbert’ [10, p. 500], he clearly copied from the above mentioned passage, mentioning also the question ‘of finding a standard of simplicity for mathematical proofs’.

5 See MacLane's recollections in [13].

6 See Gentzen ([22, p. 237], English translation of [23]): ‘A foremost characteristic of Hilbert's point of view seems to me to be the endeavour to withdraw the problem of the foundations of mathematics from philosophy and to tackle it as far as in any way possible with methods proper to mathematics.’

7 In [26, §6.1], the

One contribution of 11 to a theme issue ‘The notion of ‘simple proof’ - Hilbert's 24th problem’.

Full issue here.

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9:30 AM - 5:30 PM

University of Wollongong (Australia)

Building 19

2nd floor - Research Hub

It is clear in today’s cognitive science that sometimes how something is perceived is not informed by what we think or believe. Some visual illusions, like the famous debate on the colour of the dress, in 2015, show that sometimes one cannot bring ourselves to see what one knows to be the case. Those cases clearly illustrate that perceiving is sometimes dissociable from, or not informed by background cognizing.

Modular theories rightly acknowledge that there has to be some kind of boundary between perceiving and cognizing. They explain it through the idea of an informational boundary between perceiving and cognizing.

Philosophical arguments, however, increasingly question this view. Advocates for ‘cognitive penetrability’ reject ‘encapsulation’ as a modular feature. They argue that there has to be an intelligible link between perception and cognition, such that perceptual experience becomes informed (and not informationally encapsulated) from cognitive attitudes.

These philosophical arguments are also motivated by empirical research in neuroscience. One example of this is in research concerning the so-called binding problem: the problem of explaining how the diverse elements of perception and cognition are integrated or interact so as to generate or manifest a single, unified perceptual experience. One way of explaining the binding problem is to hold that top-down cognising binds perceptual experience by embodying predictions or anticipations that parametrize or force conformity in lower-levels. Claiming that perceiving is informed by cognizing, these theories reject the perception/cognition informational boundary.

This conference aims to explore new boundaries between cognition and perception. Do these new theories that claim some form of dissolution allow some form of explanatory boundary? Both cognitive penetrability and predictive processing advocate for the dissolution of perceptual processing in background cognizing, are these two frameworks compatible?If cognitive content is introduced even before any processing of sensory information in early vision, what exactly is left to perceptual processing?

- Jakob Hohwy (Monash University)
- Fiona Macpherson (University of Glasgow)
- Michael Kirchhoff (University of Wollongong)
- Venerable Dr Juewei (Nan Tien Institute)
- Inês Hipólito (University of Wollongong)

All full program will be available here soon.

inesh@uow.edu.au

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This book explores the relationship between schizophrenia and common sense. It approaches this theme from a multidisciplinary perspective. Coverage features contributions from phenomenology, cognitive neuroscience, philosophy of mind, psychology, and social cognition.

The contributors address the following questions: How relevant is the loss of common sense in schizophrenia? How can the study of schizophrenia contribute to the study of common sense? How to understand and explain this loss of common sense?

They also consider: What is the relationship of practical reasoning and logical formal reasoning with schizophrenia? What is the relationship between the person with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and social values?

Chapters examine such issues as rationality, emotions, self, and delusion. In addition, one looks at brain structure and neurotransmission. Others explore phenomenological and Wittgensteinian theories.

The book features papers from the Schizophrenia and Common Sense International Workshop, held at New University of Lisbon, November 2015. It offers new insights into this topic and will appeal to researchers, students, as well as interested general readers.

http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319739922

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Schizophrenia-Common-Sense-Explaining-Relation-ebook/dp/B07B3S1PWJ/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1520466290&sr=8-1&keywords=schizophrenia+and+common+sense

Pre-prints of the introduction available here.

Advancing a radically enactive account of cognition, we provide arguments in favour of the possibility that cultural factors permeate rather than penetrate cognition, such that cognition extensively and transactionally incorporates cultural factors rather than there being any question of cultural factors having to break into the restricted confines of cognition. The paper reviews the limitations of two classical cognitivist, modularist accounts of cognition and a revisionary, new order variant of cognitivism – a Predictive Processing account of Cognition, or PPC. It argues that the cognitivist interpretation of PPC is conservatively and problematically attached to the idea of inner models and stored knowledge. In abandoning that way of understanding PPC, it offers a radically enactive alternative account of how cultural factors matter to cognition – one that abandons all vestiges of the idea that cultural factors might contentfully communicate with basic forms of cognition. In place of that idea, the possibility that culture permeates cognition is promoted.

Full paper available for download

We focused on the mind-life continuity thesis and the autopoietic account, which requires a reciprocal influence and determination of first- and third-person accounts. In this paper, we studied phenomenal data as a crucial fact for the domain of living beings, which, we expect, can provide the ground for a subsequent third-person study.

We are very thankful to the special contributions of Teresa Rodrigues from IMM, Faculty of Medicine, University of Lisbon, Portugal; Nuno Rosa, Maria Jose Correia, and Marlene Barros from the Institute of Health Sciences (ICS), Center for Interdisciplinary Research in Health (CIIS), Universidade Católica Portuguesa, (Viseu, Portugal); and Mário Simões from LIMMIT lab, Faculty of Medicine, and Mind-Brain College, from the University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal. The authors also wish to thank Michael Kirchhoff for his insightful comments on the paper, and the Lisbon Wide Minds Group for the fruitful discussion during the presentation of the project at Nova University of Lisbon. The authors would like also to thank the important comments of the reviewers, and the patience of the editors. Inês Hipolito would like to acknowledge that this paper was made possible by an International Postgraduate Award from the University of Wollongong, Australia.

There are two fundamental models to understanding the phenomenon of natural life. One is the computational model, which is based on the symbolic thinking paradigm. The other is the biological organism model. The common difficulty attributed to these paradigms is that their reductive tools allow the phenomenological aspects of experience to remain hidden behind yes/no responses (behavioral tests), or brain ‘pictures’ (neuroimaging). Hence, one of the problems regards how to overcome methodological difficulties towards a non-reductive investigation of conscious experience. It is our aim in this paper to show how cooperation between Eastern and Western traditions may shed light for a non-reductive study of mind and life. This study focuses on the first-person experience associated with cognitive and mental events. We studied phenomenal data as a crucial fact for the domain of living beings, which, we expect, can provide the ground for a subsequent third-person study. The intervention with

pagination_jpbm_1265.pdf |

visual_preception_beyond_content Presentation |

We invite chapter contributions for the volume “The Mind-Technology Problem – Investigating Minds, Selves and 21st Century Artifacts” forthcoming in the book series

In the process, these technologies may be viewed as a form of rapidly evolving cognitive enhancement (Schneider, 2016, Heersmink, 2015). They may also be radically changing the human cognitive profile (Schneider and Mandik, 2016, Clowes, 2015; Clark, 2007) including the possibility of mind uploading (Corabi and Schneider, 2012). Some see these trends as deeply worrying, undermining a raft of our cognitive and social capacities (Carr, 2010; Turkle, 2011). Others see the relationship as a more of a continuum with the long history of artifactually led, cognitive evolution of human beings (Malafouris, 2013; Clark, 2003).

These technologies appear to have important implications for the human mind, sense of identity and even perhaps what we think human beings are. Other technological tendencies may stretch our ideas further toward super-intelligence, (within the skin) cognitive enhancements, and more distantly perhaps, machine consciousness. Yet while ideas of artificial general intelligence, cognitive enhancements and a smart environment are widely commented on, a serious analysis of their philosophical implications is only now getting started.

In this edited volume, we seek the best philosophical analysis of what current and near future 21st technology means for the metaphysics of mind. Some of the questions still open include: Should the adoption or incorporation of current technologies, such as smart phones or wearable gadgets be viewed as enhancements or diminishments of the human mind? Or is such a framework too restricted? Might they transform the sorts of self-knowledge available to us, or what self-knowledge is? Might the use of such gadgetry force us to rethink the boundary between human beings and technology, or indeed enduring philosophical questions such as personal identity or what the self is? According to various theories of personal identity, are radical cognitive enhancements even compatible with personal survival?

In thinking about minds, there is a common tendency to define the ontological status of the mind in terms of whatever is the latest technology. The computational model of mind has certainly been one of the most influential and is currently undergoing important challenges and challenging reinventions (Schneider and Mandik, 2016). Is the notion that the mind or self as a program, which often guides public and philosophical discussions, metaphysically well founded? Whether or not our minds are actually computational, our ability to interface with machines, from virtual reality technologies such as Oculus Rift to our smart-phones and wearable gadgetry, are undergoing a profound shift and are rapidly reshaping the metaphors and concepts philosophers use to think about minds and the conclusion they draw (Metzinger, 2009; Chalmers, 2007).

As a follow up of our “Minds, Selves and 21st Century Technology” meeting in Lisbon (http://mindandcognition.weebly.com/mind-selves-and-technology.html), we seek high quality submissions that investigate the philosophical implications of the engagement between 21st century technology, metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. We are especially interested in submissions that do not indulge in extensive futuristic speculation but focus on current or near-ready technologies which are already changing the shape of the human (and machine) cognitive landscape and our philosophical understanding of mind. Research question include the following:

· How should we think of distributed and extended memory in the context of 21st century technology?

· Can artifacts make possible new forms of extended self-knowledge? What are the consequences of artifacts—for instance, the ubiquitous smart-phone—for notions such as the minimal self, the narrative self, or the distributed self?

· What is the role of cognitive artifacts in the cognitive enhancement debate?

· Does the current state of the art of machine consciousness, brain enhancement or smart ambient technology warrant predictions and extrapolations on questions like personal identity, privacy, super intelligence, etc. many want to make?

· Does current work in this realm tell us anything about phenomenal consciousness? The organization of mind? The possibility of artificial minds?

· Do hierarchical predictive processing systems support the theoretical literature on the metaphysics of mind (mind, big data, minds online, deep minds)?

· Would an uploaded mind be me? Is mind uploading a myth?

· Does radical brain enhancement challenge our sense of self, personal identity and / or humanity?

Susan Schneider (University of Connecticut)

Gualtiero Piccinini (University of Missouri – St. Louis)

Mark Bickhard (Lehigh University)

Paul Smart (University of Southampton)

Richard Heersmink (Macquarie University)

Ron Chrisley (University of Sussex)

Georg Theiner (Vilanova University)

Keith Frankish (University of Crete)

Gerald Vision (Temple University)

Papers should not exceed 8,000 words.

We especially encourage researchers who are women and/or underrepresented minorities to submit

For further questions please contact the editors: Robert W. Clowes (robert.clowes@gmail.com), Klaus Gärtner (klga@gmx.de), or Inês Hipólito (hipolito.ines@gmail.com)

Please send your contributions to

Deadline:

Carr, N. (2010).

Chalmers, D. (2007). Forward to Supersizing the Mind

Clark, A. (2003).

Clark, A. (2007). Re-inventing ourselves: The plasticity of embodiment, sensing, and mind.

Clowes, R. W. (2015). Thinking in the cloud: The Cognitive Incorporation of Cloud-Based Technology.

Corabi, J., & Schneider, S. (2012). Metaphysics of Uploading.

Heersmink, R. (2015). Extended mind and cognitive enhancement: moral aspects of cognitive artifacts.

Malafouris, L. (2013).

Metzinger, T. (2009).

Schneider, S. (Ed.). (2016).

Schneider, S., & Mandik, P. (2016).

Turkle, S. (2011).

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Researchers, practitioners, clinicians and other professionals from Australia and internationally are invited to submit abstracts for presentation at the 2017 Neuroscience & Society Meeting in Sydney, Australia. The meeting will feature a wide range of exciting scientific lectures and ethical, philosophical and legal discussions, with numerous networking opportunities with experts, researchers, and emerging leaders in the field of neuroethics and neurolaw. Abstracts are invited from those working in the fields of ethics, law, neuroscience, mathematics and engineering, psychology and psychiatry, philosophy, allied health care, and public policy.

Abstracts of an empirical, legal, and philosophical nature related to the field of neuroethics are welcomed. Investigators at all career stages are encouraged to submit one or more abstracts. Abstracts will be peer reviewed and acceptance will be based on content, available space, and overall program balance. A small number of selected abstracts will be invited for an oral presentation. Other selected abstracts will be invited for a poster presentation.

Presentations are welcomed on any neuroethics topic, although particular consideration will be given to those addressing the key conference themes of:

Ageing and dementia

The developing brain

Disability and mental health

Disorders of self control Moral cognition and moral technologies

Artificial intelligence and machine learning Neurolaw

Selected papers will be invited to be submitted to a special issue of the journal

More info and abstract submission here.

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